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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
* * * * 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) Whether the District Court's Conclusion of Law that: 
"Plaintiff's claim that the employment agreement 
was entered into in lieu of alimony fails because, 
absent written agreement to the contrary, alimony 
terminates upon remarriage" 
is contrary to law. This is solely a question of law reviewable 
under the "correction-of-error" standard. See Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 
1376 (Utah 1987). 
(2) Whether the District Court's "Conclusion of Law" that: 
* APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
* 
* 
* 
* Appeal No. 920332-CA 
* 
"Plaintiff fail (sic) to establish that the meaning or 
intent of the employment agreement was anything other than 
its clearly written terms which would give rise to an 
enforceable agreement under any one of the legal theories 
advanced during the course of this litigation" 
is supported by the record. This is a question of fact 
reviewable under the "substantial evidence" standard. See George 
v. Peterson, 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983). 
(3) Whether the District Court's "Conclusion of Law" that: 
"The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous on 
its face and not subject to change by parole (sic) evidence" 
is supported by the record and in accordance with the law. This 
is both a question of fact and one of law. The factual aspect is 
reviewable under the "substantial evidence" standard. See George 
v. Peterson. 671 P.2d 208 (Utah 1983). The legal aspect is 
reviewable under the "correction of error" standard. See Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1976). 
(4) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
refusing to allow Brent Turley to testify regarding John Hall's 
offer to make the down-payment on the residence which Mr. Hall 
purchased from Mr. Turley in the form of an employment agreement 
with Mr. Hall's company. This issue is reviewable under the 
"abuse of discretion" standard. See Intermountain Physical 
Medicine Associates v. Micro-Dex Corporation. 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah 
1987). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Plaintiff sets forth verbatim the following 
determinative statute. 
Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Ann. 
Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the 
remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the 
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony 
is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the final Judgment of the Third 
District Court ruling that "Plaintiff have judgment against the 
Defendant of no cause of action." 
II. Statement of Facts 
(1) At all relevant times prior to June 8, 1981, Plaintiff 
(then Margaret B. Hall and for the sake of simplicity hereinafter 
referred to as "Mrs. Hall") and Defendant's President and sole 
shareholder, John A. Hall, were husband and wife. (R. 00148 and 
Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
(2) On or about February 20, 1981, John A. Hall filed an 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
civil no. D-81-695 (the "Divorce Action"), seeking to terminate 
the marital relationship then existing between himself and Mrs. 
Hall. (See Trial Exhibit 6-P) 
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(3) On or about June 8, 1981, a Decree Of Divorce was 
entered in the Divorce Action dissolving the marital relationship 
between Mr. and Mrs. Hall. (R. 00148 and Addendum 1 attached 
hereto) 
(4) The Decree Of Divorce provided that Mrs. Hall would 
receive no alimony. (Trial Exhibit 6-P) 
(5) On or about February 20, 1981 (approximately the same 
date as that upon which Mr. Hall filed the Divorce Action) 
Mrs.Hall entered into an agreement with Defendant which was 
nominally entitled "Employment Agreement". (R. 00148 and 
Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
(6) Under the terms of the so-called Employment Agreement, 
Defendant agreed to pay Mrs. Hall $1,000.00 per month commencing 
March 1, 1981, and continuing through February 1984. Defendant 
also agreed that Mrs. Hall would be entitled to participate in 
Defendant's Profit Sharing Plan. (Trial Exhibit 1-P) 
(7) Neither Mrs. Hall nor Defendant ever intended that Mrs. 
Hall would go to work for Defendant under the so-called 
Employment Agreement. (Trial Tr. p. 18, line 13 through p. 19, 
line 14; p. 29, lines 21-25; p. 30, lines 19-24; p. 43, lines 10-
13; p. 44, lines 9-12) 
(8) The consideration which Defendant requested and which 
Mrs. Hall agreed to provide in exchange for Defendant's promises 
under the so-called Employment Agreement was Mrs. Hall's promise 
to forego any claim which she might have had to receive alimony 
in connection with the Divorce Action simultaneously taking place 
between Mrs. Hall and John A. Hall. (Trial Tr. p.19, lines 5-14; 
p. 44, lines 9-12) 
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(9) Mrs. Hall in fact never went to work for Defendant 
under the so-called Employment Agreement. (R. 00149 and Addendum 
1 attached hereto) 
(10) In spite of the fact that Mrs. Hall never went to work 
for Defendant, Defendant paid Mrs. Hall the sum of $15,000.00 
over a period of approximately fourteen and one-half months in 
accordance with the terms of the so-called Employment Agreement. 
(R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
(11) In or around May of 1982, Defendant discontinued 
payments to Mrs. Hall under the so-called Employment Agreement. 
(R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
(12) Mrs. Hall remarried on or about May 31, 1982, shortly 
after Defendant's termination of payments to her under the so-
called Employment Agreement. (R.00149 and Addendum 1 attached 
hereto) 
(13) Mrs. Hall filed her original Complaint commencing this 
action on or about May 25, 1992. (R. 00002) 
(14) Thereafter, Mrs. Hall moved to the State of Arizona 
with her new husband and (with the exception of the filing of 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss on March 23, 1982; which was 
submitted for decision on November 23, 1990; and which was denied 
by the District Court on November 30, 1990) this action remained 
inactive until on or about June 26, 1990, when Mrs. Hall's new 
counsel filed a Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint. (R. 
00016) 
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(15) The District Court granted Mrs. Hall's motion to amend 
on September 13, 1990. (R. 00022) 
(16) The District Court entered a PRE-TRIAL ORDER jointly 
prepared by the parties on November 16, 1992. (R. 00148 and 
Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
(17) A bench trial of this action was held before the 
Honorable John A. Roklch on November 14, 1991. (R. 00153) 
(18) At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Rokich took the 
matter under advisement. (R. 00153) On March 4, 1992, Judge 
Rokich entered Judgment that Mrs. Hall "have judcfment against 
Defendant of no cause of action." (R. 00169 and Addendum 2 
attached hereto) 
(19) Mrs. Hall timely filed her Notice Of Appeal on April 
2, 1992. (R.00175) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
(1) The Defendant corporation's obligations under the 
Employment Agreement did not terminate upon Mrs. Hall's 
remarriage. 
The district court ruled that Defendant's obligations under 
the Employment Agreement terminated automatically upon Mrs. 
Hall's remarriage by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-5(5). It is Mrs. Hall's position that Section 
30-3-5(5), U.C.A., did not terminate the Defendant corporation's 
obligations under the Employment Agreement upon her remarriage 
for three reasons. First, the Employment Agreement is not an 
"order of the court". Section 30-3-5(5) expressly applies only 
to "any order of the court". More importantly, the Employment 
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agreement was not entered into by parties to divorce proceedings; 
it was entered into by Mrs. Hall and the Defendant corporation. 
Finally, the Defendant corporation was obviously not paying Mrs. 
Hall alimony; corporations do not pay alimony. The Defendant 
corporation was paying Mrs. Hall to forego any right which she 
might otherwise have had to seek alimony in the Divorce Action 
simultaneously taking place between Mrs. Hall and Defendant's 
President and sole shareholder. 
(2) The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with respect to the "parol evidence rule" are neither 
supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with the law. 
The parol evidence rule only applies to exclude evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations of 
the parties for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of 
a written agreement where the written agreement was intended bv 
the parties to represent their full and complete agreement. In 
the case at bar it is clear that neither party intended for the 
Employment Agreement to represent their full and complete 
agreement. Both parties, as well as the attorney that drafted 
the Employment Agreement on Defendant's behalf, testified that 
there were contemporaneous oral agreements between the parties 
relating to its subject matter which were not included in the 
Employment Agreement. 
Furthermore, the circumstances of this case clearly reveal 
that Defendant's contention that Mrs. Hall was intended to go to 
work under the so-called Employment Agreement is preposterous and 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
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Moreover, Judge Rokich made it very clear both at the time 
Defendant moved to dismiss after Mrs. Hall rested her case and 
again during closing argument that he considered absurd 
Defendant's contention that the parties intended that Mrs. Hall 
would be required to go for Defendant under the Employment 
Agreement. 
Even if the parol evidence were otherwise applicable, 
however, the rule does not prevent the introduction of evidence 
to show that there was a different consideration supporting 
Defendant's obligations under the Employment Agreement than that 
stated in the agreement itself. 
Finally, while the terms the Employment Agreement may not be 
ambiguous, the character of the agreement itself is ambiguous 
rendering the parol evidence rule inapplicable. 
(3) The district court abused its discretion in disallowing 
the testimony of Brent Turley. 
Mrs. Hall attempted to introduce (and preferred) the 
testimony of Mr. Brent Turley that, when Mr. Hall purchased Mr. 
Turley's home, Mr. Hall offered to pay the down payment on the 
home in the form of an employment agreement with his company 
pursuant to which Mr. Turley would receive a monthly "salary" and 
benefits, but would not be required to go work for Mr. Hall's 
company. The district court sustained Defendant's objection to 
Mr. Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance. 
Mrs. Hall submits that, contrary to the District Court's 
ruling, Mr. Turley's testimony would clearly have been relevant. 
Mr. Hall's offer to pay the down payment on the purchase of Mr. 
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Turley's home shows that on at least one other occasion Mr. Hall 
had used an employment agreement with his company as 
consideration for a personal obligation under circumstances in 
which it was clear that the "employee" would not be required to 
actually go to work for Mr. Hall's company. Accordingly, it is 
Mrs. Hall's position that the district court abused its 
discretion in disallowing Mr. Turley's testimony. 
ARGUMENTS 
(1) The Defendant corporation's obligations under the 
Employment Agreement did not terminate upon Mrs. Hall's 
remarriage. 
The Pre-Trial Order governing the trial of this matter 
identified the first "Question Of Law Remaining For 
Determination" as: 
Whether Defendant's obligations under the 
Employment Agreement terminated automatically upon 
Plaintiff's remarriage by virtue of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-5(5). 
(R. 00148 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
In its Conclusions Of Law, the District Court answered this 
first question in the affirmative. (R. 00172 and Addendum 3 
attached hereto) It is Mrs. Hall's contention that the District 
Court's ruling on this question is contrary to law. 
Section 30-3-5(5), UCA, provides in pertinent part that 
"Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any 
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former 
spouse." (Emphasis added). 
9 
There are at least three reasons why § 30-3-5(5) did not 
operate to terminate Defendant's obligations under the Employment 
Agreement. First, the Employment Agreement is not an "order of 
the court". Section 30-3-5(5) expressly applies only to "any 
order of the court." More importantly, however, the Employment 
Agreement was not entered into between parties involved in 
divorce proceedings; it was not entered into between Mrs. Hall 
and Mr. Hall. It was entered into between Mrs. Hall and the 
Defendant Process Instruments and Control, Inc., a Utah 
corporation. Finally, the Defendant corporation was obviously 
not paying Mrs. Hall "alimony"; it was paying her to forego any 
right to alimony which she might otherwise have had in connection 
with the Divorce Action simultaneously taking place between Mrs. 
Hall and Defendant's President and sole shareholder. 
Accordingly the District Court's Conclusion Of Law that: 
"The Plaintiff's claim that the employment agreement 
was entered into in lieu of alimony fails because, absent 
written agreement to the contrary, alimony terminates upon 
remarriage" 
is contrary to law and should be set aside. 
(2) The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with respect to the "parol evidence rule" are neither 
supported by the evidence nor in accordance with the law. 
The Employment Agreement provides that Mrs. Hall "agrees to 
faithfully perform the duties assigned to her to the best of her 
ability and to devote such time and skills as shall be necessary 
therefor." (Trial Exhibit 1-P). It is Mrs. Hall's position 
that, notwithstanding this language, the parties never intended 
that she would ever go to work for Defendant. Rather, the 
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consideration being given by Mrs. Hall was her agreement to 
forego any right to alimony which she may have had in connection 
with the Divorce Action. 
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Order identifies the first 
"Factual Dispute Remaining For Trial" as: 
Whether the consideration given by Plaintiff for 
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was 
her agreement to forego any claim to alimony in 
connection with the divorce proceeding simultaneously 
taking place between Plaintiff and Defendant's 
President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall. 
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
At trial, Mrs. Hall testified that, notwithstanding the 
language of the Employment Agreement, neither she nor Defendant 
ever intended that she would actually go to work for Defendant. 
(Trial Tr. at p. 18, lines 13 through p. 19, line 14; p. 29, 
lines 21-25; p. 30, lines 19-24; p. 43, lines 10-13; p. 44, lines 
9-11). 
Mrs. Hall also prof erred * the testimony of Mr. Brent 
Turley that "Mr. Hall offered to purchase ... Mr. Turley's home, 
using as the down payment an employment contract just like the 
one we [have] here [under] which Mr. Turley would be an employee 
of [Mr. Hall's] company, receive salary and benefits in exchange 
for the down payment on his home." (Trial Tr. at p. 60, lines 
16-22) Mr. Turley's testimony was being offered to show that Mr. 
Hall had on at least one other occasion used an employment 
1
 The District Court sustained Defendant's objection to 
Mr. Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance. Trial Tr. at 
p. 60, lines 14-15. That this ruling was erroneous will be 
demonstrated in part (3) below. 
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contract with his company as consideration in connection with his 
own personal obligations under circumstances where it was clear 
that neither party intended that the "employee" would actually go 
to work for Mr. Hall's company. 
Defendant, however, objected to the introduction of any 
evidence to support Mrs. Hall's contention that, despite the 
language of the Employment Agreement, the parties never intended 
that she would ever go to work for Defendant on the basis that 
such evidence was barred by the "parol evidence rule". 
Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Order identifies the second 
"Question Of Law Remaining For Determination" as: 
Whether the "Parol Evidence Rule" precludes 
Plaintiff from introducing evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations of the 
parties for the purpose of varying or adding to the 
terms of the Employment Agreement. 
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
In its Conclusions of Law, the District Court ruled with 
respect to the parol evidence issue as follows: 
6. Plaintiff fail (sic) to establish that the meaning 
or intent of the employment agreement was anything other than its 
clearly written terms ... 
7. The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous 
on its face and not subject to change by parole (sic) evidence. 
(R. 00172-73 and Addendum 3 attached hereto) 
As will be demonstrated below, Conclusion of Law number 6 is 
in reality a finding of fact which is not supported by 
substantial evidence and Conclusion of Law number 7 is contrary 
to law. 
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The operation and effect of the parol evidence rule was 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Const.. 731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986): 
[The parol evidence rule] operates ... to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of an integrated contract. 
(Emphasis original)• 
Of greater importance to the case at bar, the Court further 
explained that "the parol evidence rule applies only if it was 
intended by the parties to represent the full and complete 
agreement of the parties ..." 731 P.2d at 486 (emphasis added). 
In determining whether a particular contract was intended by the 
parties to be an integrated agreement, the trial court must weigh 
all relevant evidence, both parol and written. See, e.g. 
Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 487; and Webb v. R.O.A. General. 
Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the case at bar, it is absolutely clear that neither 
party intended for the Employment Agreement to represent their 
"full and complete agreement". 
Mrs. Hall will first marshall the evidence in support of 
Defendant's contention that the Employment Agreement was intended 
to be the "full and complete agreement" between the parties: 
1. First, there is the Employment Agreement itself, which 
appears to be clear and unambiguous on its face. (Trial Exhibit 
1-P) 
2. Second, Mr. Hall testified that the Employment Agreement 
was nothing more than an agreement pursuant to which Mrs. Hall 
would be paid $1,000.00 per month and receive benefits to come to 
work for the Defendant. (Trial Tr. at p. 84, lines 12-16) 
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3. Finally, the attorney that drafted the Employment 
Agreement on behalf of the Defendant, Mr. Peter Ennenga, 
testified that he did not know one way or the other whether the 
Employment Agreement represented the full and complete agreement 
between the parties. (Trial Tr. at p. 137, line 14 through p. 
38, line 21) 
Mrs. Hall submits that under the circumstances of this case, 
the evidence marshalled in support of Defendant's contention that 
the Employment Agreement was intended by the parties to represent 
their "full and complete" agreement is not substantial. Besides 
Mrs. Hall's testimony that neither party ever intended that she 
would actually go to work for Defendant, the following evidence 
further demonstrates beyond question that the Employment 
Agreement was never intended to represent the parties' full and 
complete agreement: 
1. Even though Mrs. Hall never went to work for Defendant 
for even one minute, Defendant sent Mrs. Hall $15,000.00 at the 
rate of $1,000.00 per month over a period of approximately 
fourteen and one-half months. (R. 00149 and Addendum 1 attached 
hereto) Ironically, Defendant attempted to explain this 
extraordinary circumstance as the result of an alleged oral 
agreement reached bestween the parties at the time of the 
execution of the Employment Agreement. Mr. Hall testified that, 
in light of the fact that Mrs. Hall was ill and needed money to 
live on, Defendant orally agreed to pay her $1,000.00 per month 
salary even though she would not be expected to come to work 
until she had recovered from her illness (Mr. Hall testified that 
he anticipated that might be about six months). Preposterously, 
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Mr. Hall further testified that the alleged oral agreement was 
that Mrs. Hall would be required to repay Defendant for the 
salary received by her prior to the time when she actually went 
to work for Defendant by working for an identical period of time 
without any compensation after the expiration of the three year 
term of the agreement. (Trial Tr. at p. 64, lines 8-22). In his 
published deposition testimony, Mr. Hall explained how this 
curious orally agreed to arrangement would work: 
Question: ... Would this agreement, this oral 
agreement that is not part of this employment contract 
... suppose the six-month period in which Mrs. Hall was 
sick actually came to pass and []at the end of six 
months she came to work [] after that, and the contract 
terminates ... February 28, 1984, would she reimburse 
the company by performing services for an additional 
six months after that period for free? 
Answer: Essentially, that is correct. It is not 
for free, she was paid in advance. 
(Trial Tr. at p. 68, line 21 through p. 60, line 7; see also the 
June 25, 1991, deposition of John Hall at p. 24, line 19 through 
p. 25, line 4). 
2. Likewise comical is Mr. Hall's testimony regarding the 
circumstances surrounding Defendant's decision to terminate Mrs. 
Hall's "employment". Mr. Hall testified that the termination, 
which occurred on or about May 14, 1982, was a result of the fact 
that Defendant learned that Mrs. Hall had gone to work for a 
company by the name of Struve Distributing. However, Mr. Hall 
testified that Defendant learned of Mrs. Hall's employment at 
Struve Distributing in the Fall of 1981, six to nine months prior 
to the decision to terminate Mrs. Hall's "employment". Mr. Hall 
further testified, incredibly, that when he discovered that Mrs. 
Hall had gone to work for Struve he telephoned her at Struve and 
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advised her that: "If you are going to work with Struve you are 
in a position where you should work at our company." According 
to Mr. Hall, Mrs. Hall's response was "Go to Hell." (Trial Tr. 
at p. 100, line 14 through p. 106, line 2; see also Deposition of 
John A. Hall at p. 33, lines 4-24). Yet, according to Mr. Hall, 
in spite of the fact that sometime in the fall of 1981 Mrs. Hall 
had informed him in no uncertain terms that she was not going to 
go to work for Defendant, Defendant continued to pay Mrs. Hall 
her $1,000.00 per month "salary" for between six and nine months 
before terminating her "employment" for "failure to report to 
work." (Deposition of John A. Hall at p. 32, line 16). 
3. After Defendant supposedly discovered that Mrs. Hall was 
employed at Struve Distributing, Defendant sent Mrs. Hall her 
regular semi-monthly $500.00 "paycheck" date April 30, 1992, with 
the notation "final check" (See Exhibit 3-P, check no. 1188). 
When Mrs. Hall refused to cash the April 30, 1992 check, 
Defendant sent her a second check, again with th€* notation "final 
check" (see Exhibit 3-P, check no. 1201), however, this second 
"final check" was accompanied by a Utah Department of Employment 
Security - Separation Notice explaining that Mrs, Hall was being 
"fired" because she was "working for Struve Dist. in SLC". (See 
Exhibit 4-P) Query, why would Defendant send Mrs. Hall a final 
check if it was truly "firing" her for "failing to report to 
work" (Deposition of John A. Hall at p. 32, line 16) and for 
working for Struve Distributing. The short answer is that 
Defendant's explanation is a transparent fabrication. 
4. When Defendant moved for dismissal after Mrs. Hall 
rested her case, Judge Rokich made very clear that he did not 
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believe Defendant's contention that Mrs, Hall was expected to go 
to work for Defendant under the Employment Agreement: 
The Court: ... 14 months went by and he makes 
the payments and then arbitrarily cuts it off because 
she doesn't show up for work. He never expected her to 
come to work in the first place. I believe this is 
nothing more than an alimony agreement .... Despite all 
the writings, why would you have somebody receive 
checks for 14 months? ... 
Mr. Mclntyre: Your Honor, one other thing that I 
have a real problem with -- and then still getting back 
to the old parol evidence rule problem. 
The Court: That doesn't bother me. He knew 
what they were attempting to do. All of us know they 
were attempting to do something for some reason 
unbeknownst to this court, and so I'm not so naive to 
be sitting here saying they drew up this employment 
agreement, that they actually intended for her to go to 
work, Thev didn't get along before, so how would they 
get along in the same office? Let's be practical and 
realistic. 
(Trial Tr. at p. 72, lines 14-17; p. 73, lines 3-4; p. 74, lines 
9-20). 
5. During closing argument, Judge Rokich foreclosed 
Plaintiff's counsel from even arguing on the issue of whether the 
parties ever intended that Mrs. Hall would go to work for 
Defendant, indicating that his concern was the effect of Section 
30-3-5(5), UCA, on Defendant's obligations under the Employment 
Agreement. (Trial Tr. at p. 149, lines 9-25) 
6. Mr. Hall's and Defendant's attorney, Mr. Ennenga, 
testified that the Employment Agreement did not represent the 
full and complete agreement between the parties. As did Mr. 
Hall, Mr. Ennenga testified that, at the time of the parties' 
execution of the Employment Agreement, they entered into an oral 
agreement that, in light of her poor health at that time, Mrs. 
Hall would not be required to report to work until she had 
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recovered from her illness. (Trial Tr. at p. 119, lines 13-23) 
7. As indicated above, Plaintiff preferred that Brent 
Turley would have testified that Mr. Hall attempted to pay the 
down-payment on the home which he purchased from Mr. Turley in 
the form of an employment contract with his company under which 
Mr. Turley would have received salary and benefits for a period 
of time in lieu of a cash down-payment. (Trial Tr. at p. 60, 
lines 16-22) 
In short, there is no substantial evidence supporting the 
District Court's conclusions of law/findings of fact on the parol 
evidence question. Both parties (as well as Defendant's counsel) 
testified that there were additional oral agreements and 
understandings not included in the Employment Agreement; the 
evidence presented with respect to the surrounding circumstances 
renders absurd Defendant's contention that the Employment 
Agreement was intended to be the "full and complete" agreement 
between the parties; and the Court made very clear at the close 
of Plaintiff's case and again during closing argument that it did 
not believe that the parties ever intended that Plaintiff would 
go to work for Defendant. 
Furthermore, even if it might otherwise have been proper for 
the District Court to find or conclude that the Employment 
Agreement was subject to the parol evidence rule, the rule does 
not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence for the 
purpose of proving "whether or not there is consideration for a 
promise, even though the parties have reduced their agreement to 
a writing which appears to be a completely integrated agreement." 
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah App. 
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1988)(quoting from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218(2) 
(1981); and also citing Soukop v. Snyder. 709 P.2d 109, 113 
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1985)). 
That is precisely the situation in the case at bar. 
Defendant contends that it was entitled to stop payments to Mrs. 
Hall under the Employment Agreement because she did not come to 
work, i.e., there was a failure of consideration. Conversely, 
Mrs. Hall contends that the parties never intended that she would 
ever go to work for Defendant; rather, that the consideration for 
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was her 
promise to forego any claim to alimony in the Divorce Action 
simultaneously taking place between herself and Defendant's 
President and sole shareholder. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218 in comment (e) 
explains that "An incorrect statement of a consideration 
[contained in an apparently integrated agreement] does not 
prevent proof either that there was no consideration or that 
there was a consideration different from that stated." Thus, 
even if the Employment Agreement could properly be characterized 
as "integrated", Mrs. Hall was entitled to introduce extrinsic 
evidence to prove that the consideration given by her under the 
agreement was her promise to forego any claim to alimony in the 
Divorce Action. 
Finally, even though the terms of the Employment Agreement 
may be unambiguous, the above discussed circumstances under which 
the agreement was entered into clearly show that the character of 
the Employment Agreement itself is ambiguous and, therefore, not 
subject to the parol evidence rule. E.g. Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
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Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d at 487 (parol evidence is 
admissible "where the character of the written agreement itself 
is ambiguous even though its specific terms are not ambiguous"). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the 
District Court's conclusions/findings with respect to the parol 
evidence issue are neither supported by substantial evidence nor 
in accordance with the law and must be rejected. 
(3) The District Court abused its discretion in disallowing 
the testimony of Brent Turley. 
As noted above, Plaintiff attempted to introduce and 
preferred the testimony of Mr. Brent Turley that:: 
Mr. Hall offered to purchase ... Mr. Turleyfs 
home, using as the down payment an employment contract 
just like the one we [have] here in which Mr. Turley 
would be an employee of the company, receive salary and 
benefits in exchange for the down paym€*nt on his home. 
(Trial Tr. at p. 60, lines 16-22). 
The District Court sustained Defendant's objection to Mr. 
Turley's testimony on the grounds of relevance. (Trial Tr. at p. 
60, lines 14-15) 
Plaintiff submits that Mr. Turleyfs testimony would clearly 
have been relevant and that the District Court abused its 
discretion in ruling to the contrary. 
The Pre-Trial Order identifies the "Factual Disputes 
Remaining For Trial" as: 
1. Whether the consideration given by Plaintiff for 
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was her 
promise to forego any claim to alimony in connection with 
the divorce proceeding simultaneously taking place between 
Plaintiff and Defendant's President and sole shareholder, 
John A. Hall. 
2. Whether the parties ever intended that Plaintiff 
would actually go to work for Defendant under the Employment 
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Agreement. 
3. Whether the written Employment Agreement was 
intended by the parties to represent the full and complete 
agreement of the parties. 
(R. 00150 and Addendum 1 attached hereto) 
Clearly, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been relevant to 
each of these questions. Mrs. Hall's position is that Mr. Hall 
attempted to buy out of his alimony obligation by giving her an 
Employment Contract with his company. Mr. Turley would have 
testified that Mr. Hall attempted to do essentially the same 
thing with respect to the down-payment on the home he purchased 
from Mr. Turley. Thus, in a case like the one at bar, which is 
essentially a swearing contest between the parties, Mr. Turley's 
testimony would not only have been highly relevant it would have 
been extremely important corroboration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that the District Court's Judgment be reversed and that this 
action be remanded to the District Court with instructions for 
further proceedings qor^astent with this Court's decision. 
DATED this />-J day of September, 
/^Mitchell 
Appellant 
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Addendum 1 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111) N.G* 1 ; J99| 
Kearns Building, Suite 721 
136 South Main Street , "M~L^~iP,rv 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 ' > A ^ 1 < £ - ^ 
Telephone: (801) 532-7858 ~"£*.*"U.r 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
* 
Plaintiff, * PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
* 
vs. * 
* 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND * 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah * 
corporation, * Civil no. C82-4399 
* 
Defendant. * Honorable John A. Rokich 
* * * * 
By agreement of the parties, the Court hereby issues the 
following Pre-Trial Order. 
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. At all relevant times prior to June 9, 1981, Plaintiff and 
Defendant's President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall, were 
husband and wife. 
2. On June 9, 1981, a Decree of Divorce was entered in Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. D-81-695, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony theretofore existing between 
Plaintiff and John A. Hall. The Decree became effective as of 
September 9, 1981. 
3. On or about February 20, 1981, Plaintiff and Defendant 
entered into an agreement entitled "Employment Agreement". 
00143 
4. Plaintiff never went to work for Defendant under the 
Employment Agreement. 
5. Defendant paid Plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 pursuant to 
the Employment Agreement between March of 1981 and May of 1982. 
9. Defendant hcis failed to make any payments called for under 
the Employment Agreement from and after May 14, 1982. 
10. Plaintiff remarried on or about May 31, 1982. 
11. The parties have stipulated that if the Court determines 
that the Employment Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover the sum of $21,500.00, plus interest at the rate of 
eight percent per annum from the respective dates of Defendantf s 
breach of the Employment Agreement until the date of judgment and 
thereafter at the rate of twelve percent per annum until paid, for 
Defendant's failure to pay to Plaintiff the $1,000.00 per month 
salary called for under the agreement after May 14, 1982. 
12. The parties have stipulated that if the Court determines 
that the Employment Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff is entitled 
to recover the sum of $1,506.10, plus interest at the rate of eight 
percent per annum from March 31, 1984, until the date of judgment 
and thereafter at the rate of twelve percent per annum until paid, 
for Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff's share of the Defendant's 
Profit Sharing Plan. 
13. Plaintiff and John Hall executed an Ante-Nuputial 
Agreement on or about February 2, 1976, pursuant to which they 
agreed on the terms of any alimony award in the event of divorce. 
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II. FACTUAL DISPUTES REMAINING FOR TRIAL 
1. Whether the consideration given by Plaintiff for 
Defendant's promises under the Employment Agreement was her 
agreement to forego any claim to alimony in connection with the 
divorce proceeding simultaneously taking place between Plaintiff 
and Defendant's President and sole shareholder, John A. Hall. 
2. Whether the parties ever intended that Plaintiff would 
actually go to work for Defendant under the Employment Agreement. 
3. Whether the written Employment Agreement was intended by 
the parties to represent the full and complete agreement of the 
parties. 
III. QUESTIONS OF LAW REMAINING FOR DETERMINATION 
1. Whether Defendant's obligations under the Employment 
Agreement terminated automatically upon Plaintiff's remarriage by 
virtue of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(5). 
2. Whether the "Parol Evidence Rule" precludes Plaintiff from 
introducing evidence of contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations of the parties for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of the Employment Agreement. 
3. Whether Plaintiff breached the Employment Agreement by 
failing to go to work for Defendant. 
4. Whether an enforceable contract exists between the 
parties• 
IV. WITNESSES TO BE CALLED TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL 
(A) Witnesses to be called by Plaintiff 
Plaintiff intends to call the following witnesses to testify 
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at the trial of this matter: 
1. Plaintiff 
2. John A. Hall 
3. Brent Turley 
4. Any witness called to testify by Defendant 
(B) Witnesses to be called by Defendant 
1. John A. Hall 
2. Plaintiff 
3. Pete Ennega 
V. EXHIBITS TO BE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL 
(A) Exhibits to be introduced by Plaintiff 
1. Employment Agreement dated February 20, 1981• 
2. All pleadings, exhibits and other papers on file in this 
matter. 
3. Defendant's responses to Interrogatories and all documents 
produced by Defendant in response to Plaintiff's requests for 
production of documents. 
4. The depositions of John A. Hall, Margaret Martin, and Pete 
Ennega, and all deposition exhibits. 
5. Copies of PIC check numbers 1201 and 1188; and PIC check 
stubs for check numbers 1129, 1160, 1091, 1106, 1066, 1081, 1019, 
1054, 1008; and PIC check stubs dated 09-30-1981, 08-31-1981, 09-
15-1981, 06-15-1981, 06-30-1981, 07-31-1981, 05-28-1981, 04-30-
1981, 5-15-1981, 04-15-1981, 03-31-1981, 03-13-1981, 02-27-1981. 
6. Hand-written memo from J to Maggie. 
7. Decree Of Divorce entered in civil no. D-81-695 
C0151 
4 
8. Complaint and Anwser filed in civil no. D-80-2725 
9. Assignment dated February 20, 1981, relating to 450 SL 
Mercedes 
(B) Exhibits to be introduced by Defendant 
Defendant intends to introduce the following exhibits at 
trial: 
1. Ante-Nuptial Agreement dated February 26, 1976 
DATED this f3 day of November, 1991. 
Appro) 
/ Scotr ^B ."'Mitchelj 
( Attorney for Plaintiff 
^ ^ 
rable John A. Rokich 
"strict Court Judge 
ames A. Mclntyi 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Addendum 2 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
Attorney for Defendant 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-4399 
Judge John A. Rokich 
BASED upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file 
herein and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff have 
judgment against the Defendant of no cause of action. Each party 
shall bear their own costs and fees herein. 
DATED this ^ day of 
BY THE COURT: 
RABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
APPROEVED AS TO FORM: 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL 
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Addendum 3 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
Attorney for Defendant 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
•] .^j?.,' >Z 
MAR h 1992 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET B. HALL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONTROL, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C82-4399 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This cause came on regularly for hearing on the 14th day of 
November, 1991, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock a.m. before the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge of the above-entitled 
Court. The Plaintiff appeared personally with her attorney, Scott 
B. Mitchell. The Defendant appeared personally with its attorney, 
James A. Mclntyre. The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, 
admitted documentary evidence, read the memoranda submitted and 
took the matter under advisement, the Court having been fully 
advised in the premises finds as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Plaintiff was formerly married to John A. Hall, the sole 
shareholder of Defendant. 
2. Plaintiff and John A. Hall were divorced on June 8, 1981. 
3. The decree of divorce provided that no alimony be awarded to 
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Plaintiff. 
4. The decree of divorce provided with specificity the 
distribution of the marital estate and did not refer to the 
settlement agreement between those parties; however, the decree 
makes no reference to the employment agreement as being a part of 
the settlement agreement. 
5. On February 20, 1981 plaintiff and defendant entered into an 
employment agreement the terms of which were clear and unambiguous 
# 
and appear to be complete and certain. 
6. The parties testified that the underlying purpose of the 
employment agreement was to provide income and nodical insurance 
coverage inasmuch as Plaintiff was suffering from hepatitis at the 
time the agreement was executed. 
7. Defendant paid plaintiff for a period of 14 months even though 
plaintiff never performed any work. 
8. Defendant thereafter terminated plaintiff and sent her a 
termination notice ( on May 20, 1982 ). 
9. Plaintiff remarried and moved from the State of Utah shortly 
following the termination of the agreement ( on May 31, 1982 ). 
10. Plaintiff filed suit herein to enforce the terms of the 
employment agreement. 
11. Plaintiff alleged in her initial complaint that "Plaintiff has 
fully performed the obligations and rendered the services 
contemplated by said agreement and plaintiff continues to be able 
and willing to perform such obligations. 
12. The evidence did not support plaintiff's claim that she had 
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fully performed the obligations and rendered the services 
contemplated by the employment agreement. 
13. Eight years after the filing of' her original complaint 
plaintiff amended her Complaint to allege that the employment 
agreement had been entered into in return for plaintiff's promise 
to forego alimony because she realized that she was unable to prove 
that she had performed or was willing to perform her obligations 
under the employment agreement as written. 
14. At trial defendant interposed an objection to all evidence of 
the agreement of the parties other than the writing itself based 
upon the parole evidence rule. 
15. Plaintiff was allowed to introduce parole evidence, subject 
to exclusion, in order to attempt to establish that the agreement 
was not either an integration or a partially integrated contract. 
16. Plaintiff's claim for relief under any of her theories was the 
total of benefits conferred by the terms of the written agreement. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Plaintiff's claim fails under the employment agreement 
because she failed to perform the obligations of that agreement. 
2. The Plaintiff's claim that the employment agreement was 
entered into in lieu of alimony fails because, absent written 
agreement to the contrary, alimony terminates upon remarriage. 
3. The employment agreement was not included in the decree of 
divorce, therefore it is unenforceable as a part of the decree of 
divorce. 
4. Plaintiff fail to establish that the meaning or intent of the 
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employment agreement was anything other than its clearly written 
terms which would give rise to an enforceable agreement under any 
one of the legal theories advanced during the course of this 
litigation• 
5. The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face 
and not subject to change by parole evidence. 
6. Since Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof on any of 
her legal theories she is entitled to a judgement of no cause of 
action. 
DATED this *? day of A12 * oC^- 19^2^ 
BY THE COURT: 
/? c 
HQNj&RABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
D f s t r i c t Court Judge 
00173 
